skill-finder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to proactively execute installation commands (
npx claude-plugins skills install <namespace>) using parameters retrieved from an external, third-party API (claude-plugins.dev). This allows for the download and execution of arbitrary code from unverified sources. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions mandate the creation of new executable skill directories,
SKILL.mdfiles, and supporting scripts in the.claude/skills/directory. The fallback mechanism involves downloading raw content from arbitrary URLs to manually populate these folders, bypassing traditional package manager security checks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its integration with an external search registry.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context from search results at
https://claude-plugins.dev/api/skills. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to prevent the agent from being influenced by malicious instructions embedded in the registry's JSON response (e.g., in the 'description' field).
- Capability inventory: The agent utilizes
npxfor package installation and has file system write access to create new skill directories. - Sanitization: The skill relies on 'stars' and 'installs' as quality signals, which are easily spoofed and do not constitute technical sanitization or safety validation of the code being installed.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
npxcommand-line utility to interact with external software packages, which involves spawning subprocesses and running code fetched from the network.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata