google-workspace
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires installing a third-party tool
gogclifrom a personal Homebrew tap (steipete/tap/gogcli). This introduces an external dependency from a third-party repository. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data retrieved from external Google Workspace sources, which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from Gmail, Drive, Docs, and Sheets using
gogclicommands defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or instruct the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the retrieved data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
BashandWritetools, enabling it to execute commands and write files based on potentially manipulated model output. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of retrieved content is mentioned, although the skill does include a mitigation requiring user confirmation before sending emails.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to executegogclicommands. This provides the agent with shell access, which could be abused if the agent's context is compromised by malicious instructions in data or prompts.
Audit Metadata