session-logs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes past session logs and memory files which constitute external data source ingestion.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads content from
~/.claude/projects/,memory/, andworkspace/usingjq,rg, andcat. - Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters to isolate the log content from the agent's analysis instructions in the prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted
BashandWritecapabilities, allowing it to execute commands based on interpreted data. - Sanitization: The instructions require the agent to redact API keys and tokens, but do not specify sanitization for executable or instructional patterns within the logs.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses directories containing sensitive user session history.
- Evidence: Commands target
~/.claude/projects/andmemory/folders, which store private interaction history and agent state. - Context: This access is part of the skill's primary purpose and is managed by author-provided rules to prevent the exposure of secrets.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill documentation includes setup instructions involving elevated permissions.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdlistssudo apt install jqas a prerequisite. - Context: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to show these commands to the user for manual execution rather than attempting to run them automatically.
Audit Metadata