slack-ops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data by reading Slack channel history, which serves as a vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
conversations.historyAPI call (described in SKILL.md) fetches message logs from external Slack channels into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not specify delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore or isolate instructions embedded within the message data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash(executing curl and jq),Read, andWritetools, which increases the potential impact of a successful injection. - Sanitization: No content sanitization, filtering, or escaping is applied to the message text before it is processed by the agent.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill contains instructions that encourage users to persist authentication credentials in their local environment configuration.
- Evidence: The setup section in
SKILL.mdsuggests that users add theSLACK_TOKENto shell profile files such as~/.zshrcor~/.bashrcto maintain the environment variable across sessions.
Audit Metadata