RAG
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses several local directories for storing RAG-related metadata, including server configurations and subscription costs.
- Evidence: The YAML frontmatter in
SKILL.mddefinesconfigPathssuch as~/Clawic/data/finances/,~/Clawic/data/servers/, and~/Clawic/profile.yaml. - Context: These paths are used to track infrastructure details and cost metrics associated with the RAG pipeline. As these are vendor-specific paths (under the
Clawicdirectory) managed by the skill's author, they are documented as standard functionality for this tool suite. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external documents (e.g., PDFs, wiki pages, transcripts), which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted documents are ingested into the RAG corpus, as described in the 'Ingesting hostile sources' section of
SKILL.mdand the 'Prompt Injection From Indexed Documents' section ofsecurity.md. - Boundary markers:
security.mdrecommends using structural separation (fenced, labeled blocks) and system prompts to distinguish data from instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill performs file read/write operations within the
~/Clawic/data/directory to manage indices and logs. - Sanitization: The skill documents defensive measures such as ingestion-time scanning for malicious Unicode or instruction-shaped text, and programmatic verification of citations.
Audit Metadata