clickup
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill documentation specifies that user credentials for the service are stored in a persistent local file at
~/.clawlink/credentials.json, which is a sensitive file path that could be targeted for data exposure. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on
npxto download and execute the@useclawlink/clipackage from the NPM registry during setup and usage, representing the execution of external code not bundled with the skill. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to perform operations by executing shell commands via the
@useclawlink/clitool, providing a path for potential command injection if user inputs are not properly handled by the agent. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process content from an external platform (ClickUp) which could contain adversarial instructions.
- Ingestion points: External data is brought into the agent context through actions like
clickup_get_task,clickup_get_tasks, andclickup_get_task_commentsas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions include a procedural note to "confirm with the user before any write," but there are no technical boundary markers or specific instructions for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the retrieved ClickUp data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses shell command execution capabilities via
npx @useclawlink/cliand network access through the same tool. - Sanitization: The skill documentation does not mention any sanitization, filtering, or validation of the data retrieved from ClickUp before it is presented to the agent's context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata