slack
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
@useclawlink/clitool, executed vianpx, to interact with the Slack API. This includes commands for logging in, connecting to the workspace, and executing various Slack actions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download and run the ClawLink CLI directly from the NPM registry using
npx @useclawlink/cli. These resources are owned by the skill's vendor and are hosted on a well-known package registry. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it allows the agent to ingest arbitrary text data from external Slack conversations.
- Ingestion points: Actions like
slack_fetch_conversation_history,slack_fetch_message_thread_from_a_conversation, andslack_search_messagesretrieve content from an attacker-controllable source (Slack messages). - Boundary markers: The instructions include a manual safety check, stating the agent should "confirm with the user before any write."
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses impactful capabilities, including sending messages (
slack_send_message), deleting files (slack_delete_file), and managing user invites/removals, which could be targeted by injected instructions. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of programmatic sanitization or filtering of the Slack content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata