tables
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from external Clay tables.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via the
tableMCP tool and theclay tables queryandclay tables columns getCLI commands as described inSKILL.mdanddependency-catalog.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to isolate the retrieved table data or warn the agent to ignore instructions embedded within values or formulas.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (via the
clayCLI) and write data to the local filesystem (CSV export instructions inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill suggests basic CSV quoting for formatting but lacks semantic validation or filtering of the content retrieved from the external source.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the
clayCLI and other shell utilities likejqto perform its core functions. It provides multiple bash examples for listing tables, updating query states, and running complex queries through pipes. This behavior is documented inSKILL.mdanddependency-catalog.md.
Audit Metadata