contact-unlimited-enrichment-cascade
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interacts with the user's workspace using the
clayCLI. TheBuild.claymethod inscripts/cascade_lib.pyusessubprocess.runto execute commands such asclay workflows,clay functions, andclay triggersfor graph management and deployment. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/test_codegen.pyemploysexec()andcompile()to validate the Python code nodes generated for Clay workflows. This allows developers to test the enrichment logic locally against a mock context before committing changes to the live platform. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted contact data from webhooks or Clay tables, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions could be embedded in the enriched data fields.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the workflow via the
0a Intakenode, which accepts a flatpayloadobject or direct inputs (scripts/build_cascade.py). - Boundary markers: The skill implements a strict internal record contract and source attribution system to maintain data integrity during the enrichment process (
SKILL.md,references/cascade-config.md). - Capability inventory: The generated workflows have the capability to perform arbitrary HTTP requests via Clay's generic HTTP action and execute custom Python logic in code nodes.
- Sanitization: The skill instructions acknowledge that the target execution environment is limited to basic string and JSON operations, which may restrict the implementation of complex sanitization filters.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: A core feature of the cascade is the
callback_url, which allows the finished record—containing potentially sensitive PII like mobile numbers and work emails—to be POSTed to an external URL provided by the caller at runtime (scripts/build_cascade.py).
Audit Metadata