fit-engagement-matrix

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data (contact name, email, and activity) from webhooks or form fills. This data is subsequently processed by agent nodes (LinkedIn Finder and ICP Judgment).
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md and references/workflow-graph.md define trigger nodes that receive external payloads.
  • Boundary markers: Agent prompts in references/scoring-code.md use bracketed interpolation (e.g., {{contact_name}}) and include explicit constraints to use only provided info and avoid inventing facts.
  • Capability inventory: The workflow has the capability to write back to the installer's Audiences records (update-audiences-record). It does not have access to send emails or write to external CRMs automatically.
  • Sanitization: The Clean contact code node performs basic validation, such as identifying email types and stripping URL protocols from domains.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill builds a workflow containing Python script nodes. These scripts are provided as static, auditable templates in references/scoring-code.md and perform deterministic logic (headcount math, industry keyword matching). The execution environment is the platform's standard sandboxed code-node runner.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions guide the agent to use the clay CLI for environment verification (clay whoami) and workflow deployment. These are platform-specific administrative actions necessary for the skill's primary purpose and do not involve executing untrusted shell commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 11, 2026, 05:06 PM