prospect-one-account

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from both CRM records and public web research, creating an attack surface where malicious content in those sources could potentially influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Public company research results (hiring, funding, leadership signals) in Step 7 and CRM activity/opportunity records in Step 5.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions provide specific logic for judging engagement and drafting emails based on canonical use cases, which acts as a functional boundary, though no explicit sanitization or "ignore embedded instructions" delimiters are used for external content.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute tool routines (enrich-company, cpj-find-lists-of-people), query CRM databases, and perform local file-write operations for configuration storage (Step 12).
  • Sanitization: The skill does not explicitly describe mechanisms to sanitize or escape external data before it is interpolated into the prompts used to generate the email sequence.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions require the agent to verify the execution environment and perform tasks using the clay CLI and connected tool routines.
  • The agent uses clay whoami and clay routines get to check status and pricing.
  • It invokes specific routines like enrich-company and cpj-find-lists-of-people for data retrieval.
  • These are identified as vendor-owned resources for 'clay-run' and are consistent with the skill's primary function.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 30, 2026, 05:29 PM