prospect-one-account
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from both CRM records and public web research, creating an attack surface where malicious content in those sources could potentially influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Public company research results (hiring, funding, leadership signals) in Step 7 and CRM activity/opportunity records in Step 5.
- Boundary markers: The instructions provide specific logic for judging engagement and drafting emails based on canonical use cases, which acts as a functional boundary, though no explicit sanitization or "ignore embedded instructions" delimiters are used for external content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute tool routines (
enrich-company,cpj-find-lists-of-people), query CRM databases, and perform local file-write operations for configuration storage (Step 12). - Sanitization: The skill does not explicitly describe mechanisms to sanitize or escape external data before it is interpolated into the prompts used to generate the email sequence.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions require the agent to verify the execution environment and perform tasks using the
clayCLI and connected tool routines. - The agent uses
clay whoamiandclay routines getto check status and pricing. - It invokes specific routines like
enrich-companyandcpj-find-lists-of-peoplefor data retrieval. - These are identified as vendor-owned resources for 'clay-run' and are consistent with the skill's primary function.
Audit Metadata