source-candidates
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
clayCLI to interact with the Clay platform. Commands includeclay whoamifor environment verification,clay searchfor candidate discovery, andclay workflows/clay routinesfor process orchestration. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: To handle data enrichment at scale, the skill dynamically generates and publishes Clay workflows at runtime using
clay workflows create,clay workflows nodes create, andclay workflows publish. These workflows are then executed viaclay routines runs startto process candidate batches. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests and processes untrusted external data from candidate profiles, including headlines, summaries, and job descriptions.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via
clay search query-mode runresults and thecpj-enrich-person-from-searchenrichment action. - Boundary markers: The instructions require the agent to quote the specific profile text used for scoring, providing a level of evidence-based verification.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform searches, create/publish/run workflows on the Clay platform, and generate pre-filled email compose links.
- Sanitization: The skill uses URI encoding for the generated
mailto:and Gmail compose links to ensure data is correctly formatted. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill processes sensitive candidate information, including names, employment history, and contact details (if requested). It generates
mailto:and Gmail compose URLs containing these details. However, the skill explicitly designs these to land as drafts in the recruiter's mailbox, ensuring no data is sent to external parties without manual human intervention.
Audit Metadata