internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions in 'examples/3p-updates.md', 'examples/company-newsletter.md', and 'examples/faq-answers.md' direct the agent to summarize content from external sources such as Slack, Email, and Google Drive. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in those messages could attempt to influence the agent's output.
- Ingestion points: Slack messages, emails, and Google Drive documents identified in the 'Tools' sections of the example files.
- Boundary markers: The skill prompts do not use delimiters or provide instructions to ignore potentially conflicting directives within the retrieved data.
- Capability inventory: No scripts, subprocess calls, or network operations are defined in the skill itself; it relies on the agent's pre-configured tool access.
- Sanitization: There is no logic provided to filter or escape the gathered content before processing it into summaries.
- [NO_CODE]: The skill consists entirely of Markdown files and a license text. No executable scripts, binaries, or configuration files that trigger code execution were detected in the package.
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