impeccable
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes project-level files (
PRODUCT.md,DESIGN.md) and browser-supplied data (manual edits) into the agent's context. This creates an attack surface where instructions embedded in project documentation or browser events could influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points:
PRODUCT.md,DESIGN.md(viascripts/context.mjs), and browser events/manual edits (viascripts/live-server.mjs). - Boundary markers: Absent in project documentation files; the agent relies on its own instruction boundaries.
- Capability inventory: File system modification (
fs.writeFileSync), arbitrary command execution (execFileSync,spawn), and network requests (fetch). - Sanitization: Minimal sanitization of external text before it is interpolated into prompts for implementation or refinement.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes local binaries and spawns child processes to facilitate its design and audit features.
- Evidence:
scripts/live-copy-edit-agent.mjsspawns AI CLIs (Claude and Codex) with flags like--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxto apply code changes.scripts/live-server.mjsand other scripts executenode,git, andpythonto inspect the repository and manage the live session. - Context: These high-privilege operations are associated with the skill's primary purpose of automating frontend design tasks.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to check for updates.
- Evidence:
scripts/context.mjsperforms afetchrequest tohttps://impeccable.style/api/versionto determine if a newer version of the skill is available. This is a non-whitelisted domain belonging to the tool's vendor.
Audit Metadata