skills/clidey/whodb/impeccable/Gen Agent Trust Hub

impeccable

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes project-level files (PRODUCT.md, DESIGN.md) and browser-supplied data (manual edits) into the agent's context. This creates an attack surface where instructions embedded in project documentation or browser events could influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: PRODUCT.md, DESIGN.md (via scripts/context.mjs), and browser events/manual edits (via scripts/live-server.mjs).
  • Boundary markers: Absent in project documentation files; the agent relies on its own instruction boundaries.
  • Capability inventory: File system modification (fs.writeFileSync), arbitrary command execution (execFileSync, spawn), and network requests (fetch).
  • Sanitization: Minimal sanitization of external text before it is interpolated into prompts for implementation or refinement.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes local binaries and spawns child processes to facilitate its design and audit features.
  • Evidence: scripts/live-copy-edit-agent.mjs spawns AI CLIs (Claude and Codex) with flags like --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox to apply code changes. scripts/live-server.mjs and other scripts execute node, git, and python to inspect the repository and manage the live session.
  • Context: These high-privilege operations are associated with the skill's primary purpose of automating frontend design tasks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to check for updates.
  • Evidence: scripts/context.mjs performs a fetch request to https://impeccable.style/api/version to determine if a newer version of the skill is available. This is a non-whitelisted domain belonging to the tool's vendor.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 06:45 AM