convex-backend
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates a pattern where untrusted data (user messages) is ingested into an LLM context, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
loadContextfunction inAGENTS.md(and theconvex/index.tsexample) fetches message data from themessagestable, which includes user-contributed content. - Boundary markers: Absent. The code builds an array of messages and passes it directly to the OpenAI API without using specific delimiters or instructions to the LLM to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to modify the database state using
ctx.db.insertandctx.runMutation(via thewriteAgentResponsefunction) and schedule future tasks. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering, escaping, or validation of the message content before interpolation into the LLM prompt.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation includes a
package.jsonfile referencing official Node.js packages for Convex and OpenAI. - Packages:
convex@^1.31.2andopenai@^4.79.0are standard libraries for interacting with their respective services.
Audit Metadata