cloudcannon-bookshop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute shell commands using standard development tools. This includes running
npx @bookshop/generateto produce site structures,npx @bookshop/initto scaffold new components, andnpx @bookshop/upto perform framework-wide upgrades. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions involve downloading and installing official vendor-owned resources. This includes various
@bookshop/*packages, the@cloudcannon/editable-regionsintegration, and Hugo modules fromgithub.com/cloudcannon/bookshop. These are necessary dependencies for the framework's functionality and migration path. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates on a variety of project files that constitute an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and process component specifications (
*.bookshop.yml), site configurations (cloudcannon.config.yml,package.json), front matter in content files, and SSG-specific templates (Astro, Hugo, Eleventy). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions for using delimiters or boundary markers to isolate untrusted data found within these project files from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill requires the ability to read and modify the file system (moving components, rewriting configuration) and execute shell commands for building and generating site metadata.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization or validation logic for the content ingested from the codebase, relying on the agent to interpret the data as-is for the migration process.
Audit Metadata