skills/cloudposse/atmos/atmos-init/Gen Agent Trust Hub

atmos-init

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill describes the capability of the atmos init command to fetch project templates from various remote sources.
  • Evidence includes support for template sources via Git, S3 buckets, OCI registries, and HTTPS URLs.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The tool documented in this skill supports the execution of lifecycle hooks during the project bootstrapping process.
  • These hooks are defined in the template manifest under spec.hooks and support the execution of sequences of steps.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the use of the Common Expression Language (CEL) within templates to handle conditional logic for fields and files.
  • The when: predicates in template manifests allow for dynamic evaluation of expressions over user-provided answers at runtime.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface where the agent processes external, potentially untrusted data that can influence its behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Remote project templates fetched via Git, S3, OCI, or HTTPS as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are documented for the template ingestion process.
  • Capability inventory: The atmos CLI, as used by the agent, can perform file system writes and execute shell commands through the spec.hooks mechanism.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the remote template content is mentioned; the security of the operation depends on the user's trust in the template source.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 7, 2026, 02:01 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — atmos-init