atmos-vhs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes and interprets external .tape files which contain shell commands. This creates a surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in files ingested from untrusted sources.\n
- Ingestion points: The
source:andtape:fields in thetype: castworkflow step, and theatmos cast record <input.tape>command-line entry point.\n - Boundary markers: The skill notes that tape syntax is interpreted directly in memory and that double-quoted strings are literal (no backslash escapes), which provides some distinction from standard templating but does not prevent adversarial injection.\n
- Capability inventory: The interpreter can execute shell commands (via
Typedirectives), write files (Output,Screenshot), and modify environment variables (export,unset).\n - Sanitization: Documentation specifies that Atmos-native templating is not applied to tape-derived steps, though commands are eventually executed in a PTY-backed shell environment.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a runtime interpreter for the VHS tape DSL, which includes capabilities for dynamic file inclusion and command generation.\n
- The
Source <file>directive allows for recursive inlining of external tape files at runtime, resolved relative to the working directory.\n - The implementation involves dynamic translation of DSL directives into shell actions across both
mode: sessionandmode: stepsexecution paths.
Audit Metadata