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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes shell commands for environment auditing and file management. In
workflows/plan.md, it runsgit log,ls, andgrepto gather context. Inworkflows/approve.md, it usescpandmkdirto promote files to documentation directories. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
workflows/allow.mdfile uses the vendor toolnpx @codevoyant/agent-kit perms addto modify agent configuration files (e.g.,~/.claude/settings.json). This is used to pre-approve the skill's permissions for background execution, effectively bypassing runtime permission prompts for its own workflows. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on
npxto execute@codevoyant/agent-kit. This package is a resource owned by the vendor (matching the author 'cloudvoyant') and is used for plan registration, permission management, and notifications. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) in
workflows/plan.mdandagents/linear-push-agent.md. It ingests untrusted data from Linear projects, issues, and external web search results (via Agent B) and interpolates this content into the prompts of background agents. - Ingestion points: Linear issue/project descriptions (
plan.mdStep 2), WebSearch results (plan.mdStep 3.5). - Boundary markers: The skill uses some headings but lacks robust delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess calls (
npx,grep), file writes (plan.mdStep 5), and network operations via MCP tools. - Sanitization: None detected for external content before prompt interpolation.
Audit Metadata