glab
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
glabCLI andgitto interact with GitLab and the local repository. Specifically, theci.mdworkflow implements a background monitoring agent that can automatically modify code and perform agit push --force-with-leaseto address CI failures. While this is a documented feature, it grants the agent significant autonomy over the codebase. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources that are not fully under the user's control, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points:
pull-comments.mdfetches user-provided discussion threads from GitLab merge requests;ci.mdretrieves CI job traces (logs) usingglab ci trace. - Boundary markers: The workflows do not explicitly define delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when presenting this external data to the agent, which may lead the agent to follow instructions embedded within comments or logs.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including writing files, making GitLab API requests (POST/PUT), and pushing code changes to the remote repository.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the fetched content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata