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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The primary dispatcher in
SKILL.mddynamically selects and executes workflow logic from theworkflows/directory based on user input (workflows/{VERB}.md). - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
allowworkflow (workflows/allow.md) usesnpx @codevoyant/agent-kitto modify the global configuration file at~/.claude/settings.json. This action adds the skill to the permitted list to bypass security prompts during background execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
approveworkflow (workflows/approve.md) and the Linear synchronization documentation (agents/linear-initiative-sync.md) utilize themcp__claude-in-chrome__javascript_toolto execute arbitrary JavaScript (window.location.href) in a browser context. This is used to bypass platform navigation dialogs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Several research agents (
competitive-researcher.md,ideation-researcher.md,market-researcher.md,user-problems-researcher.md) perform automated web research usingWebSearchandWebFetchto ingest content from arbitrary external domains, including competitor websites and community forums like Reddit and HackerNews. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. It retrieves data from untrusted external websites and synthesizes this information into project artifacts like roadmaps and PRDs. Maliciously crafted content on target websites could potentially manipulate the agent's reasoning or instructions during the synthesis and approval phases.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes the
@codevoyant/agent-kitpackage vianpxfor state management and notifications. While this is a vendor-provided tool, it represents a reliance on external executable code during runtime operations.
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