accessibility-pass
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided video content and narration transcripts to perform accessibility fixes, creating an attack surface for instructions embedded in external data.
- Ingestion points: Processes external video files and transcript text during the audit phase.
- Capability inventory: The skill modifies transcripts, adjusts video pacing, and edits visual overlays via platform-specific tools.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters to isolate untrusted data from the agent's core logic.
- Sanitization: There are no mentions of sanitizing or validating transcript content before it is used to modify project data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions suggest that the agent execute shell commands to install the vendor's MCP connector.
- Evidence: The text includes the command
claude mcp add --transport http Clueso https://connect.clueso.io/mcpas a setup step for the Claude Code assistant. - Context: While this involves automated tool installation, it targets the vendor's official infrastructure and requires user confirmation.
Audit Metadata