harness-audit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is subject to potential indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from project files such as instruction files and package manifests.
- Ingestion points: Reads content from project root files (e.g.,
CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md,package.json) and checks directories in the user's home path (detect.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat external file content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill is strictly limited to information retrieval and diagnostic output; instructions explicitly forbid file creation, command execution, or git operations (
SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of the content extracted from processed files.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill checks for the existence of files and directories outside the immediate project root to detect agent memory systems, specifically targeting paths like
~/.claude/projects/*/memory/MEMORY.mdand~/.agentmemory/(SKILL.md). This is used for diagnostic purposes to verify cross-session memory configuration. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources on GitHub, including the
open-gsd/get-shit-done-reduxandobra/superpowersrepositories, as recommendations for extending agent capabilities (recommended-skills.md). It also mentions standard packages from public registries for configuration purposes.
Audit Metadata