veo-use
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted text prompts and media assets provided by users, which are then passed to generative models, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts arbitrary text prompts and file paths for images and videos via command-line arguments in all generation scripts, including
text_to_video.py,image_to_video.py,reference_to_video.py,edit_video.py, andextend_video.py. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or specific instructions provided to the agent or the underlying model to distinguish between instructional system context and potentially malicious embedded data in the user-supplied prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses network capabilities to interact with Google's GenAI API endpoints and file-system write access to save generated video files (e.g., to
.mp4format). - Sanitization: The provided scripts do not implement sanitization, validation, or filtering of the input prompt text before it is interpolated into the model request.
Audit Metadata