catalyst-onboard
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes the
@catalyst-cloud/catalyst-skillspackage, which is managed vianpx. This is the primary tool for the skill's functionality and is explicitly allowed in the skill's environment configuration. The skill also references a specific version (0.7.0) in its internal metadata. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local commands using the
catalyst-skillsCLI to retrieve system status, verify credentials, and manage environment variables. These operations are performed through node scripts (where-am-i.mjs,lib/cli.mjs) that usespawnSync. Access to the local file system is restricted to standard configuration paths (e.g.,~/.config/catalyst-cloud/customer.json) required for the CLI's operation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes output from external CLI tools, which constitutes an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the stdout of commands like
status,ready,me, andcontractexecuted inscripts/where-am-i.mjs. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the tool outputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (restricted to the
catalyst-skillsCLI) and perform local file reads for configuration. - Sanitization: The skill scripts parse command output as JSON or split it by lines but do not implement specific security sanitization or escaping for the LLM context.
Audit Metadata