catalyst-onboard

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes the @catalyst-cloud/catalyst-skills package, which is managed via npx. This is the primary tool for the skill's functionality and is explicitly allowed in the skill's environment configuration. The skill also references a specific version (0.7.0) in its internal metadata.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local commands using the catalyst-skills CLI to retrieve system status, verify credentials, and manage environment variables. These operations are performed through node scripts (where-am-i.mjs, lib/cli.mjs) that use spawnSync. Access to the local file system is restricted to standard configuration paths (e.g., ~/.config/catalyst-cloud/customer.json) required for the CLI's operation.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes output from external CLI tools, which constitutes an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the stdout of commands like status, ready, me, and contract executed in scripts/where-am-i.mjs.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the tool outputs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (restricted to the catalyst-skills CLI) and perform local file reads for configuration.
  • Sanitization: The skill scripts parse command output as JSON or split it by lines but do not implement specific security sanitization or escaping for the LLM context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 23, 2026, 08:37 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — catalyst-onboard