concierge
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands to perform API requests and suggests the use of a package runner for initialization.
- Evidence: Execution of
curl -sS -H "Authorization: Bearer <key>" "<baseUrl>/api/v1/<route>?account=<account>"for data retrieval. - Evidence: Instructions for the user to execute
npx @catalyst-cloud/catalyst-skills join. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download and execution of a remote Node.js package during the setup process.
- Evidence: Reference to the
@catalyst-cloud/catalyst-skillspackage vianpx. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads sensitive credential data from the local file system and transmits it to an external URL. While this is functional for the skill's purpose, it establishes a pattern of sensitive data access and transmission.
- Evidence: Reads
~/.config/catalyst-cloud/customer.jsoncontainingbaseUrlandkey. - Evidence: Sends the extracted
keyas a Bearer token in theAuthorizationheader to the configuredbaseUrl. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external API endpoints that could contain adversarial instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from
/api/v1/issues,/api/v1/search,/api/v1/changes, and other tenant routes (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill instructs the agent to summarize and cite sources but does not employ specific structural delimiters to isolate untrusted data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
curl) and read local configuration files. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the content returned from the API before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata