unstick

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the local file ~/.config/catalyst-cloud/customer.json to verify the presence of authentication credentials such as API keys or OAuth refresh tokens. Reading sensitive credentials from the filesystem represents a significant data exposure surface.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill spawns the catalyst-skills CLI using child_process.spawnSync. It passes user-supplied inputs, such as ticket identifiers and justification strings, as arguments to the tool. On Windows, the process is executed within a shell environment, which could be leveraged for command injection if input is not rigorously validated.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses npx to execute the @catalyst-cloud/catalyst-skills package, which may involve downloading code from the NPM registry at runtime. This package is part of the vendor's own infrastructure and is necessary for the skill's operations.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes ticket summaries, history, and failure reasons retrieved from Catalyst Cloud. Adversarial content embedded in these fields could potentially influence the agent's behavior during the ticket release process.\n
  • Ingestion points: Ticket metadata and execution history are read via CLI commands in scripts/unstick.mjs.\n
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat external ticket data as untrusted or to ignore instructions contained within it.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute commands and perform cloud-side modifications through the release function.\n
  • Sanitization: The skill does not perform sanitization of the ticket data before it is presented to the agent for analysis.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 22, 2026, 05:52 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — unstick