catalyst-sop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to act on human feedback provided through external channels like chat or Linear threads, which could be exploited for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Chat messages and comments in Linear threads (
references/answer-arrives.md). - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instruction-ignoring delimiters are required for the agent when processing these inputs.
- Capability inventory: The agent can perform administrative actions via API calls to
/admin/*endpoints and update ticket statuses in Linear (references/levers.md,references/replan.md). - Sanitization: The instructions do not mandate sanitizing the input from human responses before using them to trigger administrative state changes.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses project-specific and standard CLI tools to execute workflow tasks.
- Evidence: The SOP involves running
linearisfor issue management andbunfor type-checking routines (references/replan.md,references/validate-failing.md). - [SAFE]: Interaction with the vendor's administrative API endpoints on the
catalystcloud.devdomain is part of the documented workflow for managing the system's internal state (references/levers.md).
Audit Metadata