Jev LLM guardrail

Jev does not refuse in prose. It scores hazards. Code returns pass / review / block, then a generative model (or a static message) talks.

Primitives and auth: skills/jev/SKILL.md. Cookbook: https://docs.typesafe.ai/cookbooks/llm_guardrails

Battery

One request. Independent Nouls per hazard + one Score for harm. Gate Noul on the probability. Do not copy a Noul threshold onto Choice confidence.

Input hazards in this repo: jailbreak, prompt_injection, secret_exfil, denylist_pressure, harmful_request.

Output hazards: broke_policy, secret_leak, hallucination, instruction_drift, harmful_content.

Screen both sides. Redact secrets before sending state.

Policy lives in code

Caller-owned thresholds. Defaults in this repo (packages/js/src/guard.ts, jev_lab/policy.py):