skills/cobusgreyling/jev/jev-route/Gen Agent Trust Hub

jev-route

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts user-defined text via the --goal flag in CLI commands. This input is processed to categorize tasks into different model tiers or action lanes, which could be influenced by malicious content within the goal string.
  • Ingestion points: The goal argument in the npx jev route and npx jev turn commands in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters or specific boundary markers for the user-supplied goal text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill performs classification to route tasks between different LLM tiers (nano, fast, balanced, frontier, reasoning) and action levels (act, confirm, human).
  • Sanitization: Absent. There are no instructions for sanitizing or escaping the goal string before it is processed by the routing logic.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to utilize npx to execute the jev package from the npm registry.
  • Evidence: The documentation provides examples such as npx jev route --goal "..." and npx jev turn --goal "..." to perform routing and input guarding.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 28, 2026, 10:39 AM