jev-route
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts user-defined text via the
--goalflag in CLI commands. This input is processed to categorize tasks into different model tiers or action lanes, which could be influenced by malicious content within the goal string. - Ingestion points: The
goalargument in thenpx jev routeandnpx jev turncommands inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters or specific boundary markers for the user-supplied goal text.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs classification to route tasks between different LLM tiers (nano, fast, balanced, frontier, reasoning) and action levels (act, confirm, human).
- Sanitization: Absent. There are no instructions for sanitizing or escaping the
goalstring before it is processed by the routing logic. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to utilize
npxto execute thejevpackage from the npm registry. - Evidence: The documentation provides examples such as
npx jev route --goal "..."andnpx jev turn --goal "..."to perform routing and input guarding.
Audit Metadata