local-llm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a mechanism for interacting with a local LLM that includes user-provided data in the prompt template. This creates an attack surface where untrusted data processed by the agent could contain malicious instructions meant to subvert the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points: The
questionparameter in theask()function provided in the Python client withinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt uses
<|im_start|>and<|im_end|>delimiters to structure the conversation, but lacks specific defensive instructions to the model to ignore any embedded commands within the user-supplied input. - Capability inventory: The skill is capable of reading local configuration files (
~/.config/mlx-dspark/api_key) and making local network requests to the inference server (http://127.0.0.1:8090). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering of the user text before it is placed in the prompt.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The provided Python client performs a programmatic read of a sensitive local file containing an API key (
~/.config/mlx-dspark/api_key). This credential is then used in theAuthorizationheader for requests sent to a local endpoint (http://127.0.0.1:8090). While this is functional behavior for a local LLM client and targets a loopback address, it constitutes programmatic access to sensitive credential files on the host system.
Audit Metadata