requesting-code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's code-reviewer subagent processes external data that could contain hidden instructions to override the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the subagent's context through the
{WHAT_WAS_IMPLEMENTED},{PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS}, and{DESCRIPTION}placeholders incode-reviewer.md, as well as via the output ofgit diffwhich inspects the project's source code. - Boundary markers: Absent. The
code-reviewer.mdtemplate interpolates these variables directly into the prompt without using specific delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within that content. - Capability inventory: The subagent is instructed to execute
git diff(incode-reviewer.md), and the primary agent executesgit rev-parseandgit log(inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of escaping, validation, or filtering of the content retrieved from the plan files or the git repository before it is processed by the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of shell commands to interact with the local filesystem and version control system.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains instructions to rungit rev-parseandgit logto identify commit ranges.code-reviewer.mdinstructs the subagent to rungit diff --statandgit diffto analyze code changes.
Audit Metadata