lcx-doctor

Fail

Audited by Snyk on Jun 23, 2026

Risk Level: HIGH
Full Analysis

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

  • Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 0.90). The doctor workflow requires capturing and citing command output and file contents (e.g., $CODEX_HOME/config.toml, plugin manifests, stderr) verbatim as evidence for each verdict, which can force the model to disclose API keys or other secrets present in those files or outputs.

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

  • Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.85). The required workflow clones public GitHub repos (gh repo clone / git clone from code-yeongyu/lazycodex and openai/codex) into /tmp, and then reads their installer/config files from those checkouts for comparisons—so outsider-authored free text from public web sources is ingested into the agent’s LLM context via the /tmp/*-source materialization and subsequent file reads.

MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

  • Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly runs git/gh clone/fetch against GitHub repos (e.g. https://github.com/code-yeongyu/lazycodex and https://github.com/openai/codex) at runtime to materialize /tmp checkouts that the doctor then reads and uses to drive its diagnostics, so fetched remote content directly controls the agent's prompts/behavior.

Issues (3)

W007
HIGH

Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

W011
MEDIUM

Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

W012
MEDIUM

Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jun 23, 2026, 11:37 AM
Issues
3
Security Audit — snyk — lcx-doctor