coding-agent-sessions
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/agent_sessions/opencode.pyto execute the localopencodebinary for session indexing and retrieval. While arguments appear to be controlled andshell=Falseis implied, this allows the agent to trigger system binary execution. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses a large number of sensitive local application directories to read private agent session logs, including
~/.claude,~/.codex,~/.opencode,~/.senpi, and VS Code global storage for various extensions. These files contain private conversation history, project structure details, and potentially hardcoded credentials from previous sessions. Although no network exfiltration was detected in the provided code, the skill provides the agent with extensive read access to private data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The entry-point script
scripts/find-agent-sessions.pydynamically loads and executes the CLI module usingrunpy.run_module, which is a form of dynamic code execution for the tool's core logic. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: As a retrieval tool, the skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. It parses historical transcripts from numerous local sources (JSONL, SQLite, Markdown) and interpolates them into the agent's context without sanitization. Malicious instructions placed in historical logs by a previous agent session or external actor (e.g., via a reviewed file) could influence the agent's current behavior.
Audit Metadata