start-work
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it reads and processes plan files from the repository (
.omo/plans/*.md) to drive subagent behaviors. Malicious instructions placed in these files by an untrusted actor could hijack the orchestration workflow.\n - Ingestion points: The skill ingests content from
.omo/plans/*.mdand.omo/boulder.jsonto determine task logic and subagent messages.\n - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured formatting (e.g.,
TASK,DELIVERABLE,SCOPE,VERIFY) to wrap subagent instructions, providing a degree of separation but no formal security boundary.\n - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to spawn subagents (
spawn_agent), perform git worktree operations, execute network requests viacurl, and drive browser automation tools.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit validation or sanitization applied to the content of the plan files before it is interpolated into agent instructions.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automates significant system and network operations through its subagents, including
git worktreemanagement and the use ofcurlfor endpoint testing and verification.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references theagent-browserrepository from Vercel Labs as a tool for browser-based Quality Assurance. This is a well-known service and the reference is documented as part of the intended verification workflow.
Audit Metadata