ulw-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which is then interpolated into prompts for subagents, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through user-provided briefs (SKILL.md) and multiple manual QA channels including HTTP response bodies, browser content, and terminal outputs (references/full-workflow.md).
- Boundary markers: While the skill uses a
TASK:prefix to structure subagent prompts, it lacks formal delimiters or specific instructions to ignore malicious content embedded within the ingested data. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
tasktool to spawn subagents, theomo-agent-toolkitCLI for state management, and standard utilities such as Git, curl, and tmux. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the 'evidence' data before it is recorded in the ledger or passed to subagents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive shell command execution for repository management (Git), network interaction (curl), and process orchestration (tmux, kill).
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates instructions and context for subagents (omo-senpi) at runtime using the
taskandworkflowtools. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and utilizes well-known external dependencies and tools including
playwright-coreand thevitesttest runner for automated verification and quality assurance.
Audit Metadata