git-keep-a-changelog
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from Git history which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the changelog generation process.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests commit subjects and bodies via
git log, net diffs throughgit diff, and existingCHANGELOG.mdcontent (SKILL.md, Step 4). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters (e.g., XML tags or unique markers) to separate the untrusted data from the agent's instructions, increasing the risk that a malicious commit message could be interpreted as a command.
- Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to write to the file system (
CHANGELOG.md) and execute shell commands via Git and PowerShell (SKILL.md, scripts/resolve-release-scope.ps1). - Sanitization: The instructions mitigate this by requiring the agent to summarize and curate facts rather than including commit logs verbatim, and by implementing a confirmation gate for worktree changes (SKILL.md, Step 3, Step 6).
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of local PowerShell scripts and Git commands to perform repository analysis.
- Evidence: It invokes
scripts/resolve-release-scope.ps1andscripts/resolve-release-entity.ps1usingpwsh -NoProfile -File, alongside variousgitsubcommands (rev-list, diff, cat-file). These scripts are bundled with the skill and appear to be purpose-built utilities for repository state classification.
Audit Metadata