codeceptjs-auth
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions create an indirect prompt injection surface by directing the agent to ingest and analyze HTML content from external web pages. A malicious website could attempt to influence the agent's behavior or code generation by embedding hidden instructions within its HTML or metadata.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mddirects the agent to "Read the real login page HTML" and "inspect the ARIA snapshot" in the Pre-flight section. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to ensure the agent ignores natural language instructions found within the ingested HTML.
- Capability inventory: The agent can write to local configuration and script files (
codecept.conf.js,steps_file.js) and execute shell commands vianpx codeceptjs. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the external HTML content is described.
- Remediation: Users should instruct the agent to treat all HTML content strictly as data for locator identification and to disregard any potential instructions or commands found within the page source.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains instructions for executing shell commands, specifically
npx codeceptjs run, which is used to verify and run the generated automated tests. - [SAFE]: The skill follows security best practices for credential management by explicitly forbidding hardcoded passwords. It mandates the use of
.envfiles for environment-driven configuration, requires thesecret()wrapper for masking sensitive data in logs, and specifies that sensitive files must be excluded from version control via.gitignore.
Audit Metadata