specialist-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied input (the "target" of the review) and interpolates it directly into a prompt template for a subagent call using the
Agenttool. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where a malicious target description could attempt to subvert the subagent's instructions. - Ingestion points: User-defined "target" and "specialist role" parsed in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent in the subagent prompt template (e.g.,
<target>is inserted without delimiters). - Capability inventory: The subagent has access to
Read,Write,Glob, andGrepfor file analysis, and theAgenttool for further delegation. - Sanitization: The skill mentions input sanitization for generating filenames, but does not sanitize the content injected into the subagent prompt.
- [SAFE]: The skill provides instructions for the user to manually override protected file hooks (using
CLAUDE_ALLOW_PROTECTED=1) when editing configuration files. This is presented as guidance for the user and does not involve the agent bypassing security controls autonomously.
Audit Metadata