claude-typer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npxorbunxto download and execute Node.js packages from the npm registry at runtime, specifically@remotion/cliand@remotion/tailwind-v4(version 4.0.440). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The video rendering process loads and executes a Remotion composition from a remote, third-party domain:
https://www.laosunwendao.com. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python script
scripts/render_claude_typer.pyusessubprocess.run()to execute shell commands (specificallynpxandbunxrunners). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: This category identifies an attack surface for processing untrusted data. * Ingestion points: The user-supplied
prompttext enters the agent context inSKILL.mdand is passed as a command-line argument to the rendering script. * Boundary markers: Thepromptis encapsulated within a JSON string inside the--propsargument to provide a structural boundary for the Remotion CLI. * Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute subprocesses, access the network to fetch rendering templates, and write video files to the current working directory. * Sanitization: Thecondense_promptfunction sanitizes the text for use as a filename by removing illegal characters, but the full prompt is passed into the rendering engine for processing without sanitization.
Audit Metadata