procedural-fish-render
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is configured to clone or update a git repository from
https://github.com/vibe-motion/procedural-fish.gitto a local workspace. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Following the repository checkout, the skill executes
pnpm installandpnpm run remotion:render. This sequence downloads external dependencies and executes scripts defined within the remote project'spackage.jsonfile. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python helper script uses
subprocess.runto call system binaries includinggit,pnpm, andcorepackfor repository management and rendering tasks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts several command-line arguments that can be influenced by user input, including
--repo-url,--props-json, and--output. These parameters control the source of the code and the parameters of its execution. - Ingestion points: Arguments passed to
scripts/render_procedural_fish.pyfrom the agent environment. - Boundary markers: None identified to separate user-provided data from instruction context.
- Capability inventory: Full subprocess execution for
gitandpnpm, network access via these tools, and local filesystem writes. - Sanitization: The script uses list-based
subprocess.runcalls which prevent basic shell injection, but it does not perform validation or integrity checks on the remote repository or the provided JSON properties.
Audit Metadata