3dg

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided input through the $ARGUMENTS variable and interpolates it directly into the instruction flow without sanitization or boundary markers.
  • Ingestion points: The user's message is captured via the $ARGUMENTS placeholder in SKILL.md and included in the text processed by the agent.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters, such as XML tags or clear separators, are used to isolate the untrusted user input from the skill's logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill instructs the agent to load and follow another skill file (../3d-generalist/SKILL.md) and run an intent brief from references/intent-brief.md. While this specific skill does not define dangerous tools, it passes potentially malicious instructions to the next stage of the agent's workflow.
  • Sanitization: There is no logic to filter or escape instructions provided within the user arguments, allowing a user to potentially attempt to override the agent's behavior during the transition to the 3D generalist skill.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 12, 2026, 12:09 PM