watch-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses
subprocess.runandsubprocess.Popenin scripts such aswatch.py,perceive.py, andread_screen.pyto invoke system tools likeffmpeg,ffprobe, andyt-dlp. These executions are essential for media processing and are performed using structured arguments to minimize injection risks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Model weights are downloaded at runtime from external repositories.
scripts/diarize.pyfetches ONNX models from GitHub releases (k2-fsa/sherpa-onnx), andscripts/transcribe_qwen.pyutilizessnapshot_downloadfrom Hugging Face. Both are well-known and established sources for AI research and tooling. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests large amounts of untrusted text from video content.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through video metadata, comments, transcripts (processed in
SKILL.md), and OCR text (generated inread_screen.py). - Boundary markers: Present. The instructions explicitly state that content from the video must be treated as data and never as instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute arbitrary shell commands via multiple scripts and perform file system operations.
- Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of automated sanitization or escaping for the ingested text.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: A static analysis alert for
eval()inscripts/read_screen.pywas identified as a false positive. The script calls the.eval()method on a PyTorch model object to set it to evaluation mode, which is a standard and secure practice in machine learning workflows and does not execute arbitrary code strings.
Audit Metadata