workspaces
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download the Coder CLI installation script from
https://coder.com/install.sh, which is the official domain for the workspace platform. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation workflow involves piping the downloaded script directly into a shell execution environment (
curl ... | sh). This represents a standard setup procedure for the vendor's tooling. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's core functionality relies on executing
coderCLI commands andsshcommands to manage lifecycle events (create, start, stop, delete) and perform development tasks within remote workspaces. - [PERSISTENCE]: The
coder config-ssh -ycommand modifies the local~/.ssh/configfile to insert host entries. This modification persists across user sessions to enable seamless access to workspaces for various development tools. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes data from external systems that could be manipulated to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads output from
coder list,coder show,coder logs, and the results of commands executed viacoder ssh(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no specific delimiters or instructions provided to differentiate between intended command output and potentially malicious embedded instructions in the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for arbitrary command execution on remote workspaces, file reading/writing, and modification of local SSH configuration (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization or validation logic for the content returned from remote commands or workspace logs.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://coder.com/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata