cover-hero

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script assets/code/src/render-cover.js uses execSync to run npx -y --no-install hyperframes browser path. This command is used to dynamically locate the Chrome browser executable on the host system to facilitate the Puppeteer rendering process.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on the puppeteer-core Node.js package, as defined in assets/code/package.json. The rendering script render-cover.js also attempts to locate this dependency within the user's local npm cache (~/.npm/_npx) if not found in the standard node_modules directory.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill performs local file system operations, such as reading Markdown files and frontmatter content via pick-template.js and writing generated HTML/PNG files into a task-specific directory (imgs/). These actions are required for the skill's core functionality of transforming text content into visual assets.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data by reading content from Markdown files (--article flag) and user input in interactive mode. This content (titles, keywords, card descriptions) is injected directly into HTML templates.
  • Ingestion points: Frontmatter parsing in pick-template.js from user-provided Markdown files.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the skill assumes the provided Markdown files are safe.
  • Capability inventory: File system writes (fs.writeFileSync), command execution via execSync, and full HTML rendering via Puppeteer.
  • Sanitization: The injectContent function in pick-template.js allows raw HTML tags (e.g., <em>, <br/>, <span>) to be injected into the templates for styling purposes, which represents a potential surface for cross-site scripting (XSS) within the Puppeteer rendering context if the input source is malicious.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 29, 2026, 01:35 AM