agy-delegation-workflow
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/dispatch-agy.pyusessubprocess.run,subprocess.Popen, andos.execvpto execute thegitandagyCLI tools. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs command arguments for the background worker based on content read from external task files located in the
.agy-tasks/directory. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The test file
tests/test_agy_delegation_contract.pydynamically generates Python script shims and executes them to simulate theagyCLI behavior during regression testing. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary workflow involves reading and processing instructions from external Markdown files (
.agy-tasks/*.md). This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if those files are sourced from or influenced by untrusted parties. - Ingestion points: Files in the
.agy-tasks/directory are read byscripts/dispatch-agy.pyand passed to the execution backend. - Boundary markers: The skill provides a template (
templates/task-prompt-template.md) to structure these tasks, but it lacks strong delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' markers to prevent an attacker from overriding the agent's behavior within a task file. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files, run tests, and execute arbitrary commands via the
agytool andscripts/dispatch-agy.py. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content of the task files before they are passed to the execution engine.
Audit Metadata