flow-setup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is instructed to run validation commands sourced from an external file (
.agents/workflow.md) and the 'hook context'. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where an attacker could place malicious commands in these files to be executed by the agent. - Ingestion points: Commands are read from
.agents/workflow.mdand the session hook context. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat this external content as untrusted or to ignore embedded directives.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands (e.g., repository-native commands,
bdtool invocations). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or human-in-the-loop confirmation before the commands retrieved from the file are executed.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves executing various repository-native and validation commands. While intended for setup verification, this capability is the primary mechanism through which the indirect injection vulnerability would be realized.
Audit Metadata