skills/cofoundy/brand-skills/brand/Gen Agent Trust Hub

brand

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a manual routing system that directs the agent to load and execute instructions from external files based on computed relative paths.
  • Evidence: The instruction "Read ../<skill>/SKILL.md (a sibling of this skill's directory) and follow it as if it had been invoked."
  • Evidence: Explicit instruction to bypass platform tools: "When a skill hands off to another by name... load that one the same way — never through the Skill tool."
  • Risk: Bypassing platform-managed tool execution removes standard guardrails and telemetry, allowing the agent to execute instructions from files that may not have been explicitly vetted for the current context.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture creates an attack surface where user-controlled input could influence which file is read from the filesystem.
  • Evidence: The routing table maps user "Needs" to "Skill" identifiers that are interpolated into filesystem paths (../<skill>/SKILL.md).
  • Risk: An attacker could provide a "need" designed to trick the agent into constructing a path traversal string (e.g., using ../../ or pointing to other sensitive directories), potentially leading to arbitrary file read or the execution of malicious instructions stored elsewhere on the system.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 23, 2026, 02:16 AM