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Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a manual routing system that directs the agent to load and execute instructions from external files based on computed relative paths.
- Evidence: The instruction "Read
../<skill>/SKILL.md(a sibling of this skill's directory) and follow it as if it had been invoked." - Evidence: Explicit instruction to bypass platform tools: "When a skill hands off to another by name... load that one the same way — never through the Skill tool."
- Risk: Bypassing platform-managed tool execution removes standard guardrails and telemetry, allowing the agent to execute instructions from files that may not have been explicitly vetted for the current context.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture creates an attack surface where user-controlled input could influence which file is read from the filesystem.
- Evidence: The routing table maps user "Needs" to "Skill" identifiers that are interpolated into filesystem paths (
../<skill>/SKILL.md). - Risk: An attacker could provide a "need" designed to trick the agent into constructing a path traversal string (e.g., using
../../or pointing to other sensitive directories), potentially leading to arbitrary file read or the execution of malicious instructions stored elsewhere on the system.
Audit Metadata