copy-reader

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The backup procedure in Step 2 of SKILL.md executes a Bash command using variable interpolation: cp "${FILE_PATH}" "${backup_path}". If the FILE_PATH parameter provided to the skill contains shell metacharacters (such as semicolons or backticks), it could allow for unauthorized command execution on the host system.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks because it ingests untrusted document content into an agent's reasoning loop.\n
  • Ingestion points: The contents of the document specified by FILE_PATH are read and directly inserted into the persona analysis agent's prompt in Step 3.\n
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat the document content as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions within that content.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities including Bash, Edit, and Write, allowing it to modify the file system and execute shell commands.\n
  • Sanitization: The skill does not perform any sanitization or filtering of the document content before it is processed by the AI persona agents.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The AUTO_IMPROVE workflow in Step 5 automatically applies file edits using the Edit tool based on recommendations generated from the analysis of the document. A malicious document could contain instructions that trick the agents into recommending destructive or unauthorized changes, which the skill would then apply without human review.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 25, 2026, 01:51 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — copy-reader