copy-reader
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The backup procedure in Step 2 of
SKILL.mdexecutes aBashcommand using variable interpolation:cp "${FILE_PATH}" "${backup_path}". If theFILE_PATHparameter provided to the skill contains shell metacharacters (such as semicolons or backticks), it could allow for unauthorized command execution on the host system.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks because it ingests untrusted document content into an agent's reasoning loop.\n - Ingestion points: The contents of the document specified by
FILE_PATHare read and directly inserted into the persona analysis agent's prompt in Step 3.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat the document content as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions within that content.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities including
Bash,Edit, andWrite, allowing it to modify the file system and execute shell commands.\n - Sanitization: The skill does not perform any sanitization or filtering of the document content before it is processed by the AI persona agents.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
AUTO_IMPROVEworkflow in Step 5 automatically applies file edits using theEdittool based on recommendations generated from the analysis of the document. A malicious document could contain instructions that trick the agents into recommending destructive or unauthorized changes, which the skill would then apply without human review.
Audit Metadata