customers
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a Python script using a path determined dynamically at runtime via shell commands:
python3 "${WORKSPACE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-$(ls -td "$HOME"/.claude/plugins/cache/insight-wave/cogni-workspace/*/ | head -1)}/scripts/get-market-config.py". Using shell expansion and directory listing to resolve executable paths is a brittle pattern that can be exploited if the directory structure is manipulated. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: There is a potential for command injection in the execution of the market configuration script. The instruction specifies passing a
<region-code>argument to the script; if this value is sourced from untrusted project files (likeportfolio.json) without validation, it could allow for arbitrary shell command execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted data from multiple local files and interpolates it into instructions for sub-agents without using boundary markers or delimiters.
- Ingestion points:
portfolio.json,markets/*.json,propositions/,competitors/, andcontext/context-index.json. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Writetool to modify the filesystem and theAgenttool to perform web research and delegate tasks, providing a path for injected instructions to affect the system or external state. - Sanitization: No validation or escaping of the external content is performed before it is passed to the sub-agents.
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